



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# YALE LAW JOURNAL

---

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, \$2.50 A YEAR.

SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.

---

## EDITORIAL BOARD

H. W. ARANT,  
*Chairman*

P. B. BUZZELL,  
*Secretary*

B. SELDEN BACON,  
BENTON BAKER,  
CLARENCE E. BARTON,  
JOHN F. COLLINS,  
JOSEPH M. CORMACK,  
HOWARD W. CURTIS,  
DOUGLAS D. FELIX,  
ROBERT C. FLUHRER,

CHAS. E. CLARK,  
*Grad. Treasurer*

WILLIAM F. HEALEY,  
*Business Manager*

WILLIAM W. GAGER,  
WILLIAM B. GUMBART,  
VINCENT L. KEATING,  
MAX H. LEVINE,  
CLAUDE B. MAXFIELD,  
WILLIAM W. MEYER,  
MICHAEL MOSES,  
CARROLL R. WARD.

---

Published monthly during the Academic year, by THE YALE LAW JOURNAL COMPANY, INC.  
P. O. Address, Drawer Q, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.

---

If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a continuation of the subscription is desired.

---

## THE RIGHTS OF A RIPARIAN OWNER IN LAND LOST BY EROSION

In a recent case<sup>1</sup> decided by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey it was held, that if land was formerly fast land and the title was lost by erosion, it became the property of the state, not merely as long as it remained under water, but, if the state made a riparian grant, absolutely.

When is title lost by erosion? Can the state deprive a riparian owner of his right to accretion without compensation, or is such right a vested right which can be taken away only by proper proceedings and upon due compensation?

The rules applying to accretion and erosion are inseparably bound together, the gains of one compensating for the losses of the other. By the common law of England, two distinct cases were recognized. First, when the land was gained by gradual

---

<sup>1</sup> *Dewey Land Co., et al. v. Stevens et al.*, 90 Atl. (N. J.) 1040; 91 Atl. (N. J.) 934.

accretion or dereliction, land so made belonged to the owner of the adjoining upland. Second, when the land was gained by sudden avulsion or reliction, the land thus formed belonged to the king.<sup>2</sup> Conversely, and by way of compensation, when the sea gradually encroached on the land, the Crown took the benefit, while if such encroachment were sudden and violent, the subject did not lose his property, if he could still identify his property when it reappeared.<sup>3</sup>

The American cases are rather unsatisfactory. The opinions are loose and inaccurate, and contain numerous incorrect dicta. The advice of Lord Ellenborough<sup>4</sup> is particularly applicable. He said, "The rule stated in each case, like every other proposition laid down by a judge, ought to be understood with particular reference to the facts of the case then before the court."

Perhaps the most widely quoted rule is that although land be submerged by the sea, yet if it eventually reappear and remain capable of identification, the title thereto revests in the original owner.<sup>5</sup> Where the rule has been thus stated, the land had been suddenly washed away, and in so far as limited to such facts the cases are correct. But when the sea, lake or navigable stream gradually and imperceptibly encroaches upon the land, the loss falls upon the owner, and the land thus lost returns to the ownership of the state.<sup>6</sup> The title to such land is lost and cannot revest in the original owner if the land subsequently reappear. Whatever rights the original owner may acquire in the reformed land arise from his right of accretion and not from the former title.

When the land has returned to the ownership of the state, is that ownership absolute, or is it subject to certain rights of the adjacent riparian owner? Clearly, this ownership is subject to the right of the riparian owner to acquire title to the land, if it reappear as an accretion to his fast land. This right to alluvion is a vested right. It is an inherent and essential attribute to the

---

<sup>2</sup> *Hargrave's Law Tracts*, p. 30; 2 *Bl. Com.* 262; *Angell, Tide-waters*, pp. 264, 265.

<sup>3</sup> *In re The Hull and Selby R. R.*, 5 *M. & W.* 327; *Hale, De Jure Maris*, chap. 4; *Moore's History of the Foreshore*, p. 381.

<sup>4</sup> *Hunter v. Prinsep*, 10 *East.* 392.

<sup>5</sup> *Widdecombe v. Chiles et al.*, 173 *Mo.* 195; *Stockley v. Cissna*, 119 *Fed.* 812; *Mulry v. Norton et al.*, 100 *N. Y.* 424; *VanDevanter v. Lott*, 172 *Fed.* 574; *Murphy v. Norton et al.*, 61 *How. Pr.* 197.

<sup>6</sup> *Matter of City of Buffalo*, 206 *N. Y.* 319

original property, which cannot be taken away, even by the state for public use, without compensation.<sup>7</sup>

The decision in the principal case is undoubtedly correct, though the language used by the judge in his opinion is not strictly accurate. The custom of judges to digress from the facts of a case, and to lay down rules of law not necessary for the decision of the case in point, is a most pernicious one. It makes the reports of our cases unnecessarily long, and has given rise to many of the misconceptions of what the law actually is.

VALIDITY OF A GIFT MORTIS CAUSA MADE IN CONTEMPLATION  
OF SUICIDE.

A depositor in a bank drew a check and sent it to his betrothed in contemplation of suicide. Held, the transaction, if a gift *mortis causa*, is invalid under N. Y. Consol. Laws c. 40 sec. 2301 declaring that suicide is a grave public wrong.<sup>1</sup>

The effect of this decision is to punish one, the innocent donee, for the wrong of another. The case relied on for authority, and which it is believed is the only one in point, seems to be wrong. The reason given is that such a gift is contrary to public policy, but no such policy is evident. There are three reasons for the punishment of a wrong: reformation of the wrong-doer, retribution, and prevention of recurrences of the wrong.<sup>2</sup> This holding is supported by none of these reasons. It can neither reform nor wreak vengeance on the wrong-doer for he no longer exists. The very statute on which the decision rests does not make suicide a crime, the legislature realizing the "impossibility of reaching the successful perpetrator." It can not appreciably prevent other suicides, for either this rule would be unknown or, if known, the intending suicide would either make an absolute gift or would not care. A man may commit suicide for one or both of two reasons, because he hopes thereby to benefit some one for whom he has greater affection than for his own life or because the burden of living is greater than the instinctive dread

---

<sup>7</sup> *County of St. Clair v. Lovington*, 23 Wall. 46; *Freeland v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.*, 197 Pa. 529; *Knudsen v. Omanson*, 10 Utah 124; *Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press*, 18 La. 122; *Farnham, Waters and Water Rights*, p. 324.

<sup>1</sup> *Bainbridge v. Hoes*, 149 N. Y. Supp. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Holmes, The Common Law*, p. 42.